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GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
 
                                              
*
 Honorable Kathleen M. O‟Malley, United States Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, sitting by designation. 
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 Appellant Mary Burton (“Burton”) alleges that her 
employer, Teleflex Inc. (“Teleflex”),1 terminated her 
employment in violation of the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., and Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. § 
2000e et seq.  Burton also alleges various state law 
discrimination, contract, and tort claims against Teleflex.  
Teleflex claims that it did not terminate Burton‟s 
employment, but that she in fact resigned her position.  The 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania granted summary judgment in favor of Teleflex 
on Burton‟s discrimination claims, finding that Burton had 
resigned, and that even if she had not, she could not 
demonstrate that Teleflex‟s purported justification for sending 
her the letter “accept[ing her] resignation” was pretextual.  
The District Court also granted summary judgment to 
Teleflex on all of Burton‟s state law claims.  Because the 
record clearly demonstrates that a dispute of material fact 
exists as to whether Burton resigned or was terminated, we 
vacate the District Court‟s grant of summary judgment on 
Burton‟s discrimination claims and breach of contract claim.  
We affirm the grant of summary judgment on Burton‟s claims 
for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, 
                                              
1
 Unless otherwise specified, our reference to Teleflex 
throughout the opinion is a collective reference to all five 
Defendants in this case, including Teleflex Inc., Teleflex 
Medical Inc., Specialized Medical Devices LLC (collectively, 
the “Corporate Defendants”), Edward Boarini, and Sean 
O‟Neill.   
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wrongful interference with contractual relations, and 
defamation.   
I. BACKGROUND 
 Burton was the founder of two companies that 
manufactured and distributed medical device parts.  She 
founded HDJ during the 1960‟s and formed Specialized 
Medical Devices (“SMD”) in 1993.  Burton served as the 
companies‟ President, and her son Edward Burton 
(“Edward”) was the General Manager and Vice President.  By 
2006, the companies grew to employ approximately 140 
people and generated an annual revenue of $14 million.  In 
2007, Burton sold HDJ and SMD to Teleflex Inc.  After 
acquiring the companies, Teleflex discontinued the HDJ 
division and incorporated SMD into the Teleflex Medical 
OEM business. 
 As part of the transaction, Burton and Edward each 
entered into a separate two-year long employment agreement 
with Teleflex.  Burton‟s employment agreement (the 
“Employment Agreement” or “Agreement”) provided that she 
could terminate her employment with Teleflex by providing 
written notice at least thirty days before her termination 
would become effective.  This is the only provision regarding 
Burton‟s authority to terminate the Agreement.  On the other 
hand, Teleflex could terminate Burton in one of two ways.  
First, it could fire Burton without cause by providing written 
notice at least thirty days before her termination would 
become effective.  Second, Teleflex could fire Burton for 
cause, upon written notice.
2
  Under the Employment 
                                              
2
 The Employment Agreement defines “cause” as (1) the 
failure to perform an obligation under the agreement, after 
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Agreement, Burton would be entitled to severance if Teleflex 
terminated her without cause. 
 Burton, age sixty-seven at the time of the sale, became 
Vice President of New Business Development at SMD.  Her 
duties included directing and supervising the sales department 
at SMD, overseeing the customer service of existing 
accounts, developing new business, and preparing price 
quotations for customers.  Burton had performed these same 
duties at SMD prior to the sale to Teleflex. 
 From the fall of 2007 until the end of her employment 
with Teleflex, Burton was supervised by Edward Boarini 
(“Boarini”), Senior Vice President and General Manager of 
Teleflex Medical OEM.  Burton and Boarini had a strained 
professional relationship, and communication between the 
two was infrequent.
3
  As Vice President of New Business 
                                                                                                     
notice and an opportunity to cure; (2) conduct that would hold 
the Company in disrepute or scandal; (3) failure to follow 
lawful directions of the Board; (4) breach of fiduciary duty to 
the Company; or (5) gross neglect of the employee‟s duties, 
or any act of theft or dishonesty.  
 
3
 Burton traveled frequently as part of her job with Teleflex.  
Moreover, Boarini did not work in the same office as Burton.  
Both of these factors contributed to their infrequent 
interactions.  Burton further claims that Boarini excluded her 
from business communication and sales meetings, and that he 
did not evaluate her performance or prepare a performance 
appraisal for her.  Although Boarini claims that he had 
difficulty communicating with Burton and that she did not 
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Development, Burton supervised the sales department for 
SMD.  However, in February or March 2008, Dave Faris 
(“Faris”), a male in his forties, was transferred from another 
Teleflex division to be the director of sales for SMD, and the 
sales team then began reporting to him instead of Burton.  
Boarini acknowledged that “sales leadership . . . was a duty 
[of Burton‟s] that was removed.”  (App. 504.)  Boarini also 
told Faris “to work very closely with [Burton]” and to learn 
from her.  (App. 738; see also App. 373-74, 505.) 
 The problems between Burton and Boarini came to a 
head on June 3, 2008.  That day, the two attended a medical 
device trade show in Manhattan.  Boarini stated that he 
intended to discuss with Burton her lack of communication 
and undefined performance objectives.  At their depositions, 
both parties recounted their version of the conversation. 
Burton testified about the encounter: 
[A]nd I came up to Ed [Boarini] and I said, I 
asked him when he wanted to get together 
because he had talked to me on the phone the 
previous Friday and mentioned that he wanted 
to meet with me. 
 
So when I got there I went to him and 
asked him when did he want to get together and 
he couldn‟t really even look me in the face.  He 
said, Oh, well, he was going to be really busy, 
                                                                                                     
clearly define her performance objectives, it is undisputed 
that Boarini never informed Burton of any performance 
issues. 
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he had all these customers he had to see, he 
didn‟t have time that day, he didn‟t think he 
would have any time the next day, he was too 
busy, and then he talked about maybe I can give 
you ten minutes or so on Thursday, and I said, 
you know, I made all my appointments to be 
later because I thought you were very specific 
about wanting to get together with me, and he 
was just kind of treating me like I wasn‟t even 
there and he was treating me like a useless old 
woman and just like I wasn‟t there, and he 
couldn‟t come up with any answer.  It was like 
what do you mean I want to see you. 
 
 I mean, he just was pretty much just 
trying to get rid of me.  And I finally pressed it, 
I said, are you asking for me to resign?  Do you 
want me to resign?  That‟s what I said to him.  
Do you want me to resign? 
 
 He said, Oh, no, no, we want you here 
for a long time to come and he was like, Oh, no, 
no, that‟s not what I mean at all.  We need you.  
We want you for a long time. 
 
 And I don‟t know if too much more 
happened right at that moment, but I started to 
walk away and shortly thereafter he said to me, 
he said, I think you should think about that. 
 
(App. 137.) 
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Boarini‟s testimony was fairly consistent with 
Burton‟s account: 
 
I had gone there with every intention to try to 
have a dialogue with Mary Burton and 
determine what she wanted to do with the 
business because she had not had any progress 
on her performance objectives or any kind of 
dialogue.  And within a few minutes of talking 
to her about setting up a time to have that 
conversation, she resigned. . . . 
 
 She asked me if I wanted her to resign.  I 
said, no.  Wait.  Let‟s talk through this.  Let‟s 
have a dialogue.  Let‟s understand what we can 
do because we knew — I felt the relationship 
with her was not working to the betterment of 
the business. 
 
 And twice she said, do you want me to 
resign?  And I said, no.  The third time is when 
I said, maybe you should think about retiring.  
That‟s when she decided to resign. 
 
(App. 185.) 
 
 Despite Boarini testifying that Burton resigned at the 
end of their conversation, he acknowledged that Burton never 
explicitly said that she was resigning.  As Boarini recalled, 
the conversation ended when Burton disengaged and walked 
away.  However, two other Teleflex employees at the trade 
show, Faris and Jack Fulton (“Fulton”), claimed that Burton 
informed them on June 3, 2008, that she had resigned when 
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she returned to the Teleflex booth after her conversation with 
Boarini.  These two employees then told Boarini that Burton 
had resigned.  Based on his conversation with Burton, and the 
accounts of Faris and Fulton, Boarini determined that Burton 
had resigned. 
 The next day, Wednesday, Burton met with Faris to 
discuss a work-related matter.  Burton did not return to 
Teleflex‟s booth on Wednesday or Thursday, the latter of 
which she claimed was because she was upset about the 
conversation with Boarini.  On Friday, Burton left on a one-
week vacation that she had scheduled several weeks prior to 
the incident with Boarini‟s knowledge and approval. 
 It is unclear if Burton had any contact with the office 
while she was away on vacation.
4
  On the day that she was 
scheduled to return to work, June 16, 2008, Burton received a 
letter from Sean O‟Neill (“O‟Neill”), Vice President of 
Global Human Relations for Teleflex Medical, stating that 
Teleflex was formally “accept[ing her] resignation.”  (App. 
211.)  Even though Burton was not entitled to severance in 
the event that she resigned, the letter stated that Burton would 
receive six months‟ severance if she extended the non-
competition and non-solicitation clauses in her Employment 
                                              
4
 Burton testified at her deposition that she could not recall if 
she called the office regarding work while she was away.  
However, in her Verified Statement, Burton claimed that she 
did call while she was away and that she was told her calls 
would not be patched through.  Edward Burton‟s deposition 
testimony also discussed this happening. 
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Agreement.  The severance was also conditioned on her 
releasing Teleflex from any liability relating to her 
employment.  O‟Neill later testified that he determined that 
Burton had resigned in reliance on Boarini‟s assessment and 
the statements from other employees that Burton had told 
them she resigned. 
 On June 16, 2008, the same day as O‟Neill‟s letter to 
Burton, Teleflex sent a letter to its customers stating that 
Burton “decided to leave the company to pursue other 
opportunities.”  (App. 436.)  Boarini emailed Teleflex 
employees the next day, June 17, 2008, to tell them that 
Burton had left the company “to pursue other opportunities.”  
(App. 236.) 
 Burton claims that she was in disbelief when she 
received the letter from O‟Neill, because she did not resign.  
Burton reached out to her lawyer, but at no point did she ever 
personally contest the letter or her termination with anyone at 
Teleflex.  All of her communication with Teleflex was 
conducted through her lawyer, Michael Jarman.  
Additionally, Burton never attempted to return to work.  
Instead, through her attorney, Burton tried to negotiate the 
terms of her separation from Teleflex.  Negotiations broke 
down, however, and no agreement was reached. 
 Burton‟s employee file at Teleflex reflects that she was 
removed from payroll on June 17, 2008.  However, in the 
space on the form asking the reason for the change in status, 
in which “quit without notice,” “retired,” and “resigned” were 
all options, none of the corresponding boxes was checked.  
Instead, the form was filled out to state that she “[l]eft [the] 
co[mpany] to pursue other opportunities.”  (App. 433.)  
Teleflex does not dispute that Burton never explicitly said to 
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Boarini that she was resigning, nor does it dispute that she 
never submitted a letter of resignation, despite the 
requirement in her Employment Agreement that she do so. 
   Following the breakdown of the negotiations, Burton 
filed suit in the District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania alleging several claims against Teleflex:  (1) 
age discrimination under the ADEA; (2) gender 
discrimination under Title VII; (3) age and gender 
discrimination under the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act 
(PHRA), 43 Pa. Const. Stat. § 951 et seq.; (4) breach of 
contract; (5) breach of the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing; (6) wrongful interference with contractual relations; 
and (7) defamation.
5
  Teleflex moved for summary judgment.  
On September 29, 2011, the District Court granted summary 
judgment in favor of Teleflex on all of Burton‟s claims, in an 
order without memorandum opinion.  The District Court 
issued its Memorandum Opinion on November 2, 2011.  
Burton v. Teleflex, No. 09-CV-2684, 2011 WL 5237709 (E.D. 
Pa. Nov. 2, 2011). 
 On October 6, 2011, Burton filed a timely notice of 
appeal from the District Court‟s Order granting Teleflex‟s 
motion for summary judgment. 
                                              
5
 Burton brings her ADEA and Title VII claims against the 
Corporate Defendants only, her PHRA claim against all 
Defendants, her breach of contract and breach of the duty of 
good faith and fair dealing claims against only the Corporate 
Defendants, and her wrongful interference with contract and 
defamation claims against only Boarini and O‟Neill. 
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II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 
1331 and 1367.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
1291.  We exercise plenary review over the District Court‟s 
grant of summary judgment and apply the same standard that 
the District Court would apply.  Howley v. Mellon Fin. Corp., 
625 F.3d 788, 792 (3d Cir. 2010).  A grant of summary 
judgment is appropriate where the moving party has 
established “that there is no genuine dispute as to any 
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).6  A fact is material if it 
might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.  
Scheidemantle v. Slippery Rock Univ. State Sys. of Higher 
Educ., 470 F.3d 535, 538 (3d Cir. 2006).   
 Where the defendant is the moving party, the burden is 
on the defendant to show that the plaintiff has failed to 
establish one or more essential elements of her case.  Hugh v. 
Butler Cnty. Family YMCA, 418 F.3d 265, 267 (3d Cir. 2005).  
The reviewing court should view the facts in the light most 
favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable 
inferences in that party‟s favor.  Scheidemantle, 470 F.3d at 
538.  However, to prevail on a motion for summary judgment, 
                                              
6
 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 was revised in 2010.  
The standard previously set forth in subsection (c) is now 
codified as subsection (a).  The language of this subsection is 
unchanged, except for “one word — genuine „issue‟ bec[ame] 
genuine „dispute.‟”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 advisory committee‟s 
note (2010 amend). 
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“the non-moving party must present more than a mere 
scintilla of evidence; „there must be evidence on which the 
jury could reasonably find for the [non-movant].‟”  Jakimas v. 
Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 485 F.3d 770, 777 (3d Cir. 2007) 
(alteration in original) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986)).         
III. ANALYSIS 
 Burton argues that the District Court erred in granting 
summary judgment to Teleflex.  She claims that the District 
Court improperly made credibility determinations as to the 
evidence before it, did not consider all of Burton‟s evidence, 
and gave undue credit to Teleflex‟s version of the facts.  The 
central issue on appeal is the factual question of whether 
Burton resigned from Teleflex or whether she was terminated.  
Because we believe there is a genuine dispute as to this 
question and believe resolution of that dispute may be 
determinative of Burton‟s breach of contract and 
discrimination claims, we vacate the grant of summary 
judgment on those claims.   
 
 Burton has not demonstrated disputes of material fact 
as to her remaining state law claims.  As such, summary 
judgment was properly granted on her claims for breach of 
the duty of good faith and fair dealing, wrongful interference 
with contract, and defamation.   
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A. Age and Gender Discrimination Claims 
1. Legal Standards for Establishing 
Employment Discrimination 
 
 The ADEA and Title VII prohibit discrimination on 
the basis of age and sex, respectively.
7
  Because Burton has 
not provided direct evidence of discrimination, our inquiry 
under both statutes is governed by the three-part framework 
established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 
792, 802-03 (1973).  See Smith v. City of Allentown, 589 F.3d 
684, 691 (3d Cir. 2009) (reaffirming the use of the 
McDonnell Douglas standard in ADEA cases involving 
indirect evidence); Scheidemantle, 470 F.3d at 538-39 
(applying McDonnell Douglas standard to Title VII gender 
discrimination claim concerning indirect evidence).   
 Under the first step in the McDonnell Douglas 
analysis, the plaintiff bears the burden of making out a prima 
facie case of discrimination.  Scheidemantle, 470 F.3d at 539.  
To establish a prima facie case of age discrimination under 
the ADEA, Burton must make a showing that:  (1) she is forty 
years of age or older; (2) the defendant took an adverse 
employment action against her; (3) she was qualified for the 
                                              
7
 The ADEA prohibits employers from discriminating against 
individuals in hiring, discharge, compensation, terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment on the basis of their 
age.  See 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1).  Title VII likewise prohibits 
employers from discriminating against individuals on the 
basis of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.  See 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2). 
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position in question; and (4) she was ultimately replaced by 
another employee who was sufficiently younger to support an 
inference of discriminatory animus.  Smith, 589 F.3d at 689.   
 To make a showing of a prima facie case of gender 
discrimination under Title VII, Burton must show that:  (1) 
she was a member of a protected class; (2) she was qualified 
for the position; (3) she suffered an adverse employment 
action; and (4) members of the opposite sex were treated 
more favorably.  Hugh, 418 F.3d at 267 (citing McDonnell 
Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-03).  A plaintiff may also meet the 
last element by showing that the adverse employment action 
“occurred under circumstances that could give rise to an 
inference of intentional discrimination.”  Makky v. Chertoff, 
541 F.3d 205, 214 (3d Cir. 2008).   
 To establish a prima facie case at summary judgment, 
“the evidence must be sufficient to convince a reasonable 
factfinder to find all of the elements of [the] prima facie 
case.”  Duffy v. Paper Magic Grp., 265 F.3d 163, 167 (3d Cir. 
2001) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  If a plaintiff fails to raise a genuine dispute of 
material fact as to any of the elements of the prima facie case, 
she has not met her initial burden, and summary judgment is 
properly granted for the defendant.  See Geraci v. Moody-
Tottrup, Int’l, Inc., 82 F.3d 578, 580 (3d Cir. 1996).   
 Once the plaintiff makes out her prima facie case, “the 
burden of production [then] shifts to the defendant to offer a 
legitimate non-discriminatory [justification] for the adverse 
employment action.”  Smith, 589 F.3d at 690; see also 
Simpson v. Kay Jewelers, Div. of Sterling, Inc., 142 F.3d 639, 
644 n.5 (3d Cir. 1998).  This burden is “„relatively light‟” and 
is satisfied if the employer provides evidence, which, if true, 
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would permit a conclusion that it took the adverse 
employment action for a non-discriminatory reason.  Tomasso 
v. Boeing Co., 445 F.3d 702, 706 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting 
Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 763 (3d Cir. 1994)); see also 
Lichtenstein v. Univ. of Pittsburgh Med. Ctr., 691 F.3d 294, 
302 (3d Cir. 2012) (describing this step as a “minimal 
burden”).  At this stage, “the defendant need not prove that 
the articulated reason actually motivated its conduct.”  
Shellenberger v. Summit Bancorp, Inc., 318 F.3d 183, 189 (3d 
Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted).   
 The third step in the McDonnell Douglas analysis 
shifts the burden of production back to the plaintiff to provide 
evidence from which a factfinder could reasonably infer that 
the employer‟s proffered justification is merely a pretext for 
discrimination.  Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 764-65; see also Sarullo 
v. U.S. Postal Serv., 352 F.3d 789, 799-800 (3d Cir. 2003).  
The plaintiff must make this showing of pretext to defeat a 
motion for summary judgment.  Doe v. C.A.R.S. Prot. Plus, 
Inc., 527 F.3d 358, 364 (3d Cir. 2008) (explaining that, “to 
defeat a motion for summary judgment, [the plaintiff] must 
show that the employer‟s articulated reason was a pretext for 
intentional discrimination”).  To make a showing of pretext, 
“the plaintiff must point to some evidence, direct or 
circumstantial, from which a factfinder could reasonably 
either (1) disbelieve the employer‟s articulated legitimate 
reasons; or (2) believe that an invidious discriminatory reason 
was more likely than not a motivating or determinative cause 
of the employer‟s action.”  Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 764.   
 
 The plaintiff‟s evidence, if it relates to the credibility 
of the employer‟s proffered justification, “must demonstrate 
such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, 
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incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer‟s proffered 
legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder 
could rationally find them „unworthy of credence.‟”  Fuentes, 
32 F.3d at 765 (quoting Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-
Cohen, 983 F.2d 509, 531 (3d Cir. 1992)).  As we have 
explained, if a plaintiff has come forward with sufficient 
evidence to allow a finder of fact to discredit the employer‟s 
proffered justification, she need not present additional 
evidence of discrimination beyond her prima facie case to 
survive summary judgment.  See Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 764; 
Fasold v. Justice, 409 F.3d 178, 185 (3d Cir. 2005).  This is 
because the factfinder may infer from the combination of the 
prima facie case, and its own rejection of the employer‟s 
proffered reason, that the employer engaged in the adverse 
employment action for an invidious reason.  Fuentes, 32 F.3d 
at 764; see also Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 
530 U.S. 133, 147 (2000) (“Proof that the defendant‟s 
explanation is unworthy of credence is simply one form of 
circumstantial evidence that is probative of intentional 
discrimination, and it may be quite persuasive.”).  The 
plaintiff is therefore not required to produce direct evidence 
of discriminatory intent to demonstrate pretext and survive a 
motion for summary judgment.       
2. District Court Opinion on 
Discrimination Claims 
 
 The District Court first determined that, even in the 
light most favorable to Burton, the evidence weighed in favor 
of a finding that she had resigned, and had not been 
terminated.  Burton, 2011 WL 5237709, at *3 n.7.  Because a 
plaintiff must suffer an adverse employment action to state a 
prima facie case of employment or gender discrimination, the 
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District Court could have based its grant of summary 
judgment on its conclusion that Burton had suffered no 
adverse employment action.  See Duffy, 265 F.3d at 171 
(affirming the district court‟s grant of summary judgment 
because the plaintiff “did not produce evidence from which a 
reasonable jury could find an adverse employment action, 
which is a prerequisite to a successful age discrimination 
claim”).    
 However, the District Court presumed, for purposes of 
summary judgment, that Burton had stated a prima facie case, 
and proceeded to conduct the McDonnell Douglas burden 
shifting analysis.  It determined that Teleflex had proffered a 
legitimate non-discriminatory reason for sending Burton the 
resignation letter — namely, that Teleflex reasonably 
believed that Burton had resigned.  Burton, 2011 WL 
5237709, at *3.  Under this analysis, the burden then shifted 
to Burton to demonstrate that Teleflex‟s justification for 
sending her the letter was pretextual.  The District Court 
determined that none of the evidence proffered by Burton 
“call[ed] into question Boarini‟s or O‟Neill‟s belief that [she 
had] resigned,” or created a “triable issue that discriminatory 
animus existed and was a moving factor behind Teleflex‟s 
[actions].”  Id. at *5.  The District Court therefore granted 
summary judgment for Teleflex on Burton‟s age and gender 
discrimination claims. 
 As explained below, the District Court erred by finding 
that there was no dispute of fact as to whether Burton 
resigned or was terminated.  Because the District Court‟s 
determination that Burton resigned improperly impacted its 
pretext analysis, we vacate the grant of summary judgment 
and remand for further proceedings. 
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3. Dispute of Material Fact Relating to 
Burton’s Separation from Teleflex 
 
 Contrary to the District Court‟s determination, Burton 
has proffered evidence from which a factfinder could 
conclude that Teleflex terminated her.  Burton maintains that 
she did not resign from Teleflex, and that she never told 
anyone that she had resigned.  In fact, no Teleflex employee 
ever confirmed with Burton that she had actually resigned 
before Teleflex “accepted [her] resignation.”  (App. 211; see 
also App. 553-54, 797.)  Instead of verifying whether Burton 
intended to resign, the company mailed her a letter on June 
16, 2008, when she returned from her vacation, notifying her 
that it was accepting her resignation.  The author of the letter, 
Sean O‟Neill, said that he determined that Burton had 
resigned based on Boarini‟s assessment and the statements of 
other employees. 
 At his deposition, Boarini admitted that Burton never 
said that she was resigning.  Moreover, Teleflex 
acknowledged that Burton never submitted a resignation letter 
or formally notified the company in any way that she was 
resigning despite the fact that Burton‟s employment 
agreement provided that she must provide written notice to 
the company at least 30 days before her resignation is to be 
effective.  As we pointed out at oral argument, there is no 
evidence that Burton ever said she was resigning to anyone 
above her in the chain of command.  Boarini also admitted 
that he did not contact Burton after the incident on June 3, 
20 
 
2008 to confirm that she resigned or to ask her for a letter of 
resignation.
8
   
 
 According to Boarini, Faris and Fulton told him on 
June 3, 2008, that Burton had told them that she resigned.  
The District Court credited the testimony of these employees 
in deciding that Burton had in fact resigned.  However, the 
court did not credit the testimony of Burton herself, who 
denied having told anyone that she resigned.  Nor did the 
District Court consider the conflicting testimony of Edward 
Burton, who spoke to Burton subsequent to her conversation 
with Boarini.  They discussed Burton‟s conversation with 
Boarini, but Edward claimed that Burton said nothing about 
having resigned or having been fired.  Edward testified that 
Burton continued to work after June 3, 2008, and that 
sometime before June 16, 2008, Burton called the office to 
send in quotes and was told by the receptionist that her call 
could not be put through.  By crediting the testimony of the 
Teleflex employees and disregarding the Burtons‟ conflicting 
testimony, the District Court improperly made credibility 
determinations, which it may not do at summary judgment.  
See Doe v. Luzerne Cnty., 660 F.3d 169, 175 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(noting that at summary judgment “[t]he court may not . . . 
weigh the evidence or make credibility determinations 
because these tasks are left for the fact finder” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
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 He also testified, however, that he had no cell phone number 
for Burton, and did not know how to reach her after the June 
3, 2008 incident. 
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 Several other pieces of evidence are relevant to the 
issue of whether Burton resigned or was terminated.  First, in 
Burton‟s personnel file, on a form indicating that she was no 
longer to be paid by Teleflex, the boxes indicating that she 
either “quit without notice,” “resigned,” or “retired” were not 
checked.  (App. 433, 466-67, 810.)  Instead, the form was 
completed to say: “[l]eft co[mpany] to pursue other 
opportunities.”  (App. 433, 809.)  At her deposition, Teleflex 
Human Resources Director Margie Heilig (“Heilig”) 
conceded that she could not state from where she got that 
information because it involved a conversation with an 
attorney.  Boarini testified that he had “no idea” why the form 
was filled out in that particular way. 
 
 Second, approximately one month prior to Burton‟s 
confrontation with Boarini at the trade show, Boarini and two 
other Teleflex employees were emailing about the departure 
of Edward Burton from Teleflex.  At one point, the email 
chain shifts to discussing Burton.  An official at Teleflex, Tim 
Kelleher (“Kelleher”), tells Boarini and another employee in 
an email:  “I also talked to [Edward] about [Burton] and the 
lack of communication and sharing of information and our 
concerns about her after he leaves.  He has agreed to facilitate 
a three way conversation between [Edward], [Burton] and me 
to get her to play ball.”  (App. 413 (emphasis added).)  
Kelleher, the drafter of the email, testified that his reference 
to getting Burton to play ball merely meant that he wanted 
Edward to discuss with Burton her lack of communication.  
While that is certainly a plausible explanation, it is equally 
plausible that a reasonable juror could perceive the comment 
as a reference to pushing Burton out of the company. 
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 Third, the District Court also cited “plaintiff‟s conduct 
after receipt of the June 16, 2008 letter” as a reason for 
finding that Burton had resigned.  Burton, 2011 WL 5237709, 
at *3 n.7.  The District Court claimed that “plaintiff made no 
protest that the resignation had not occurred.”  Id. at *4.  
Boarini testified that he and others at Teleflex were surprised 
that they received no follow-up directly from Burton 
following her receipt of the June 16, 2008 letter.  Burton also 
testified that she did not initiate any contact with Teleflex 
after receiving the letter, but that she did not do so because 
she considered herself to have been fired, and believed she 
“no longer had any rights.”  (App. 385.)  Upon receipt of the 
June 16, 2008 letter, Burton contacted her attorney Michael 
Jarman, and from that point forward she only communicated 
with Teleflex “by and through [her] Attorney Jarman.”  (App. 
323.)  She further testified that she would not have contacted 
Teleflex on her own without first speaking to her attorney.  
The District Court thus did not consider that Burton 
communicated with Teleflex through her attorney following 
the June 16, 2008 letter, which undercuts its conclusion that 
she did not contest the resignation letter.   
 
 Burton also testified that, during a party that she held 
for her former employees shortly after her separation from 
Teleflex, she denied having resigned and clarified that she 
believed she had been fired.  Furthermore, Teleflex notified 
its customers of Burton‟s departure on June 16, 2008, the 
same day it sent her the letter purporting to accept her 
resignation.  This fact undercuts the District Court‟s reliance 
on Burton‟s conduct after receiving the June 16, 2008 letter.  
Once clients were notified of Burton‟s alleged resignation, 
she could reasonably have concluded that Teleflex had fired 
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her, leaving her no ability to contest her separation and return 
to her position. 
 
 Fourth, the District Court ignored evidence that Burton 
continued to perform work for Teleflex after her conversation 
with Boarini on June 3, 2008.  On June 4, 2008, Burton met 
with Faris at the trade show to train him on quoting prices to 
customers. Faris acknowledged that he had a meeting with 
Burton at the trade show after her purported resignation, and 
that during the meeting Burton was talking about working 
together.  Burton also testified that she had a previously 
scheduled vacation from June 9 to June 13, which could 
explain her absence from the office during this time period.  
Other evidence also indicates that, while she was on her 
vacation, Burton called in to the office to send in price quotes 
for customers, but that the receptionist would not put her 
through.
9
   
 
 At this stage of the litigation, there is sufficient 
evidence from which a reasonable juror could conclude that 
Burton was terminated.  The District Court ignored the fact 
that Burton never tendered her resignation, Burton never told 
anyone to whom she reported at Teleflex that she was 
resigning, Teleflex relied on hearsay statements to conclude 
that Burton had resigned, and Teleflex never once asked 
Burton if she had resigned.  While there is certainly evidence 
to suggest that Burton did resign, this evidence is refuted by 
Burton.  The District Court therefore erred when it 
                                              
9
  At her deposition, however, Burton testified that she could 
not remember whether she had called in to the office while 
she was on vacation. 
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determined that “[t]he evidence . . . weighs in favor of a 
finding that [Burton] resigned, even viewing the evidence in 
the light most favorable to [her].”  Burton, 2011 WL 
5237709, at *3 n.7.  
4. McDonnell Douglas Burden Shifting 
Analysis 
 
 The District Court granted summary judgment for 
Teleflex because it held that Burton could not show that 
Teleflex‟s justification for sending her the resignation letter 
was pretextual.  Burton, 2011 WL 5237709, at *4-5.  Because 
the District Court‟s pretext analysis was unduly influenced by 
its error regarding Burton‟s resignation, we vacate the grant 
of summary judgment and remand for further proceedings.    
 To the extent the District Court‟s pretext analysis 
suggested that Burton was required to show evidence of 
discriminatory animus to demonstrate pretext, that suggestion 
is unsupported by our precedent.  See Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 764.  
A plaintiff may demonstrate pretext at summary judgment in 
two different ways.  First, the plaintiff may point to evidence 
in the record that would cause a reasonable juror to disbelieve 
the employer‟s articulated legitimate non-discriminatory 
reason, thereby creating a genuine dispute of material fact as 
to the credibility of that reason.  See id. at 764 & n.7.  If a 
plaintiff comes forward with evidence that would cause a 
reasonable factfinder to find the defendant‟s proffered reason 
“unworthy of credence,” Lichtenstein, 691 F.3d at 310 
(internal quotation marks omitted), she need not adduce any 
evidence of discrimination beyond her prima facie case to 
survive summary judgment, Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 764; see also 
Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 100 F.3d 1061, 
1067 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc) (“[A] plaintiff may survive 
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summary judgment . . . if the plaintiff produced sufficient 
evidence to raise a genuine issue of fact as to whether the 
employer‟s proffered reasons were not its true reasons for the 
challenged employment action.”).  Second, the plaintiff may 
also defeat summary judgment by pointing to evidence that 
indicates that the employer acted with discriminatory animus.  
Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 764. 
 As discussed above, we find that Burton‟s evidence 
created a genuine dispute of fact regarding the credibility of 
Teleflex‟s proffered reason for her discharge — i.e., that a 
reasonable fact finder could find the claim that Burton 
resigned to be “unworthy of credence.”  Id. at 765.  In the 
face of such evidence, Burton did not need to present 
evidence of discriminatory animus and she should not have 
been required to do so. 
 We therefore vacate the grant of summary judgment 
on Burton‟s ADEA and Title VII claims and remand for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
B. Burton’s Pennsylvania State Law Claims 
 The District Court also granted summary judgment to 
Teleflex on all of Burton‟s state law claims.  For the 
following reasons, we vacate the grant of summary judgment 
on Burton‟s breach of contract and state law discrimination 
claims.  We affirm the District Court‟s grant of summary 
judgment regarding Burton‟s remaining state law claims. 
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1. Breach of Contract 
 The District Court granted summary judgment to 
Teleflex on Burton‟s breach of contract claim because it 
concluded that “the evidence of record, viewed in the light 
most favorable to plaintiff, is that she resigned her position.”  
Burton, 2011 WL 5237709, at *5.  Because a dispute of 
material fact exists as to whether Burton resigned or was 
terminated, summary judgment was inappropriately granted 
on her breach of contract claim.   
 Under Pennsylvania law, “[a] breach of contract action 
involves: (1) the existence of a contract; (2) a breach of a duty 
imposed by the contract; and (3) damages.”  Braun v. Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc., 24 A.3d 875, 896 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2011).  
Burton bases her breach of contract claim on Teleflex‟s 
alleged violation of her Employment Agreement.  The 
Agreement provides that Burton could be terminated in one of 
two ways:  (1) with cause, or (2) without cause, after 30 days‟ 
notice.  The Employment Agreement specifies that if Burton 
were to be terminated without cause, she would be entitled to 
a set amount of severance pay.  Teleflex does not claim that 
Burton was terminated for cause, and Boarini admitted at his 
deposition that he never brought any performance issues to 
Burton‟s attention.  The proposed separation agreement, sent 
to Burton on June 16, 2008, offered her a severance, but with 
the additional condition that she extend the non-compete 
provisions in her original Employment Agreement by one 
year.
10
  She never reached an agreement with Teleflex on the 
                                              
10
 Payment of the severance was also conditioned on Burton 
releasing the company from liability.  However, it is unclear 
whether she would have been required to sign a release had 
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terms of her separation and has not received any severance 
pay. 
 The central fact material to Burton‟s breach of contract 
claim is whether she resigned or was terminated.  If a 
factfinder were to find that Burton was terminated from 
Teleflex, he or she could also find that Teleflex breached the 
terms of the Employment Agreement.  The grant of summary 
judgment is vacated. 
2. Pennsylvania Human Relations Act 
 Burton also brings age and gender discrimination 
claims against Teleflex under the PHRA, which prohibits 
discrimination in employment on the basis of age or sex.  43 
Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 953, 955.  We have “stated „that the PHRA 
is to be interpreted as identical to federal anti-discrimination 
laws except where there is something specifically different in 
its language requiring that it be treated differently.‟”  Slagle v. 
Cnty. of Clarion, 435 F.3d 262, 265 n.5 (3d Cir. 2006) 
(quoting Fasold, 409 F.3d at 184 n.8).  The PHRA provisions 
here present no such issue, and therefore should be 
interpreted coextensively with Burton‟s ADEA and Title VII 
claims.  See Colwell v. Rite Aid Corp., 602 F.3d 495, 499 n.3 
(3d Cir. 2010) (noting that it is “proper to address ADEA and 
PHRA age discrimination claims collectively” (alteration and 
internal quotation marks omitted)); Atkinson v. LaFayette 
Coll., 460 F.3d 447, 454 n.6 (3d Cir. 2006) (“Claims under 
the PHRA are interpreted coextensively with Title VII 
claims.”).  Because we vacate the grant of summary judgment 
                                                                                                     
the company terminated her pursuant to her original 
employment agreement. 
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on Burton‟s Title VII and ADEA claims, we also vacate the 
grant of summary judgment on Burton‟s PHRA claims. 
3. Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith 
and Fair Dealing 
 
 The District Court construed Burton‟s claim for breach 
of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing as claiming 
that, but for her separation from Teleflex in 2008, she would 
have continued to be employed by Teleflex beyond the two-
year term contemplated by her Employment Agreement.  
Burton, 2011 WL 5237709, at *5.  The District Court 
concluded that no evidence in the record supported this 
contention, and granted summary judgment.  However, 
Burton argues that Teleflex breached the duty of good faith 
by terminating her employment in a manner contrary to the 
Employment Agreement, and by “contriv[ing] an illusory 
resignation to absolve them from their severance obligations 
under the Employment Agreement.”  (Br. of Appellant 26.)  
Regardless of how the claim is framed, summary judgment 
was properly granted because under Pennsylvania law, the 
implied covenant of good faith does not allow for a cause of 
action separate and distinct from a breach of contract claim. 
 Pennsylvania courts have defined the duty of good 
faith and fair dealing as “[h]onesty in fact in the conduct or 
transaction concerned,” and have held that “[w]here a duty of 
good faith arises, it arises under the law of contracts, not 
under the law of torts.”  Heritage Surveyors & Eng’rs, Inc. v. 
Nat’l Penn Bank, 801 A.2d 1248, 1253 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  Moreover, under 
Pennsylvania law, a “claim for breach of the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing is subsumed in a 
breach of contract claim.”  LSI Title Agency, Inc. v. 
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Evaluation Servs., Inc., 951 A.2d 384, 392 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
2008).  Therefore, while Pennsylvania law generally 
recognizes a duty of good faith in the performance of 
contracts, this duty “does not create independent substantive 
rights.”  Commonwealth v. BASF Corp., No. 3127, 2001 WL 
1807788, at *12 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Mar. 15, 2001); see also 
JHE, Inc. v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., No. 1790, 2002 WL 
1018941, at *5 (Pa. Commw. Ct. May 17, 2002) (“[T]he 
implied covenant of good faith does not allow for a claim 
separate and distinct from a breach of contract claim.  Rather, 
a claim arising from a breach of the covenant of good faith 
must be prosecuted as a breach of contract claim, as the 
covenant does nothing more than imply certain obligations 
into the contract itself.” (emphasis in original)).  
 Any claim that Teleflex violated the duty of good faith 
and fair dealing in the performance of the Employment 
Agreement is therefore subsumed into Burton‟s breach of 
contract claim.  Although the District Court did not utilize 
this analysis in granting summary judgment to Teleflex, 
“„[w]e may affirm the District Court on any grounds 
supported by the record.‟”  Kossler v. Crisanti, 564 F.3d 181, 
186 (3d Cir. 2009) (alteration in original) (quoting Nicini v. 
Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 805-06 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc)).  
Because Burton cannot maintain an independent cause of 
action for the breach of the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing under Pennsylvania law, we affirm the District 
Court‟s grant of summary judgment on this claim. 
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4. Wrongful Interference with Contractual 
Relations 
 
 The District Court granted summary judgment for 
O‟Neill and Boarini on Burton‟s claim for wrongful 
interference with contractual relations because she provided 
no evidence from which a factfinder could conclude that 
O‟Neill and Boarini were acting as third parties to her 
Employment Agreement when they allegedly caused its 
breach.  Burton, 2011 WL 5237709, at *5-6.  The District 
Court was correct in this conclusion and its grant of summary 
judgment on this claim is affirmed. 
 Under Pennsylvania law, the elements of a claim for 
wrongful interference with contractual relations are: (1) the 
existence of a contractual relationship between the plaintiff 
and a third party; (2) purposeful action by the defendant, 
specifically intended to harm the contractual relationship; (3) 
the absence of privilege or justification on the part of the 
defendant; and (4) damages to the plaintiff as a result of the 
defendant‟s conduct.  See Acumed LLC v. Advanced Surgical 
Servs., Inc., 561 F.3d 199, 212 (3d Cir. 2009).  However, a 
plaintiff can only bring a claim for wrongful interference 
against a third party to the contract, not against a defendant 
who is also party to the contract.  See Nix v. Temple Univ. of 
Commw. Sys. of Higher Educ., 596 A.2d 1132, 1137 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1991).  Because a corporate agent acting within the 
scope of his employment acts on behalf of the corporation, he 
is not considered a third party to the contract.  Id.  Thus, 
under Pennsylvania law, where “a plaintiff has entered into a 
contract with a corporation, and that contract is terminated by 
a corporate agent who has acted within the scope of his or her 
authority, the corporation and its agent are considered one so 
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that there is no third party against whom a claim for 
contractual interference will lie.”  Daniel Adams Assocs., Inc. 
v. Rimbach Publ’g, Inc., 519 A.2d 997, 1002 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1987); see also Maier v. Maretti, 671 A.2d 701, 707 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1995) (“Appellant, however, overlooked case law 
which holds a corporation acts only through its agents and 
officers, and such agents or officers cannot be regarded as 
third parties when they are acting in their official capacity.”). 
   
 Burton has provided no evidence from which a trier of 
fact could conclude that either O‟Neill or Boarini was acting 
outside the scope of his authority for Teleflex when each 
allegedly caused Teleflex to breach Burton‟s Employment 
Agreement.  At her deposition, Burton was asked about what 
Boarini and O‟Neill did to interfere with her Agreement.  She 
responded that Boarini gave O‟Neill the information that she 
allegedly resigned, and that O‟Neill interfered by writing the 
June 16, 2008 letter.  These allegations do not support an 
inference that either Boarini or O‟Neill was acting outside the 
scope of his authority as a Teleflex employee.  Although 
Burton argues that “[a] jury could find that Boarini and 
O‟Neill acted individually to interfere with [her] employment 
contract with Teleflex,” (Br. of Appellant 27), such 
conclusory allegations are insufficient to withstand a motion 
for summary judgment, see Betts v. New Castle Youth Dev. 
Ctr., 621 F.3d 249, 252 (3d Cir. 2010) (“Unsupported 
assertions, conclusory allegations, or mere suspicions are 
insufficient to overcome a motion for summary judgment.”). 
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5. Defamation 
 Burton brings a defamation claim against Boarini 
based on the notices that he sent to Teleflex customers and 
employees advising them that Burton had left the company 
“to pursue other opportunities.” 11  The District Court held 
that Burton could not maintain her claim against Boarini 
because the notices were not capable of defamatory meaning, 
nor could she show that she was damaged by any of these 
statements.  Burton, 2011 WL 5237709, at *7.  On appeal, 
Burton argues that the District Court erred in holding that the 
June 16, 2008 notice to customers and the June 17, 2008 
email to Teleflex employees were incapable of defamatory 
meaning.  (Reply Br. of Appellant 14-15.)  The District Court 
was correct in granting summary judgment to Boarini on 
Burton‟s defamation claim. 
 Under 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8343(a), a plaintiff is 
required to prove seven elements to make out a claim of 
defamation, including inter alia, proof of “[t]he defamatory 
character of the communication” and “[s]pecial harm 
resulting to the plaintiff from its publication.”  Whether a 
communication is capable of defamatory meaning is a 
                                              
11
 In her Complaint, Burton also brings a defamation claim 
against O‟Neill arising from the June 16, 2008 resignation 
letter.  The District Court held that Burton could not maintain 
her defamation claim against O‟Neill because the June 16, 
2008 letter was sent only to her, and therefore was never 
published.  Burton does not contest this finding on appeal, 
and thus has waived her claim against O‟Neill.  See Gorum v. 
Sessoms, 561 F.3d 179, 185 n.3 (3d Cir. 2009) (noting that 
the failure to argue an issue waives it on appeal). 
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“threshold issue” to be determined by the court.  Kurowski v. 
Burroughs, 994 A.2d 611, 617 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2010); see also 
Blackwell v. Eskin, 916 A.2d 1123, 1125 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
2007) (“Whether the contested statements are capable of 
defamatory meaning is a question of law for the court.”).  The 
plaintiff bears the burden of making this showing and “[i]f the 
court determines that the challenged publication is not 
capable of defamatory meaning, there is no basis for the 
matter to proceed to trial.”  Kurowski, 994 A.2d at 617 
(internal quotation marks omitted).   
 
 In considering whether a statement is capable of 
defamatory meaning, the court considers “whether the 
statement tends so to harm the reputation of another as to 
lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third 
parties from associating or dealing with him.”  Tucker v. 
Phila. Daily News, 848 A.2d 113, 124 (Pa. 2004) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  The statement must be examined 
in context to determine its likely effect on the reader, id., and 
the Court should evaluate the effect it is likely to produce “in 
the minds of the average persons among whom it is intended 
to circulate,” Tucker v. Fischbein, 237 F.3d 275, 282 (3d Cir. 
2001) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Furthermore, the 
statement must do more than merely annoy or embarrass the 
purported victim; “[s]he must have suffered the kind of harm 
which has grievously fractured h[er] standing in the 
community of respectable society.”  Phila. Daily News, 848 
A.2d at 124 (internal quotation marks omitted).   
 
 Burton takes issue with the statement made to Teleflex 
customers and employees that she “decided to leave the 
company to pursue other opportunities.”  (App. 436; see also 
App. 236.)  Although she claims that this statement caused 
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co-workers to become angry with her, and allegedly caused 
customers to disassociate from her, the statement says nothing 
negative, and on its own, is incapable of “grievously 
fractur[ing] [her] standing in the community of respectable 
society.”  Phila. Daily News, 848 A.2d at 124 (internal 
quotation marks omitted); see also Maier, 671 A.2d at 704-05 
(collecting cases where far more egregious statements have 
been held to be incapable of defamatory meaning); cf. Agriss 
v. Roadway Express, Inc., 483 A.2d 456, 462-63 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 1984) (holding that statement that employee “opened 
company mail” was capable of defamatory meaning because 
it implied that he committed a crime); Birl v. Phila. Elec. Co., 
167 A.2d 472, 475-76 (Pa. 1960) (holding that statement by 
plaintiff‟s former employer to his current employer that 
plaintiff “quit without giving notice” was capable of 
defamatory meaning because “recipients of such 
communication could reasonably conclude that [plaintiff] 
lacked honor and integrity and was not a person to be relied 
upon insofar as his business dealings were concerned”).   
 
 Unlike the statements in Agriss and Birl, a statement 
that Burton left the company “to pursue other opportunities” 
does not reflect negatively on her integrity, and would not 
cause the recipients of the communication to distrust her.  
Furthermore, “even if the statement . . . were false, that does 
not require a finding of defamatory character.”  Kurowski, 
994 A.2d at 619.  The District Court therefore did not err 
when it held that the statement that Burton left “the company 
to pursue other opportunities” is incapable of defamatory 
meaning.   
 
 In addition, Burton has not provided evidence that she 
was damaged by the allegedly defamatory communication, as 
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required by 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8343(a).  As the District 
Court noted, Burton held a party for Teleflex employees at 
her home after her separation from Teleflex, and she testified 
that at this point, the employees “[t]hought very highly” of 
her, and did not believe that she had actually resigned.  (App. 
146.)  She also testified that after her separation from Teleflex 
she received two job offers from companies in the industry, 
one in Lancaster and one in Oregon, and claimed that they 
“would have taken [her] any time [she] was free.”  (App. 
157.)  These facts cut against a finding that Burton was 
damaged by the statements, and Burton has not put forth any 
evidence to the contrary. 
 
 We affirm the District Court‟s grant of summary 
judgment on Burton‟s defamation claim. 
 
 C. Motion to Supplement the Record on Appeal 
 Burton has filed a Motion to Supplement the Record 
and Appendix to include an affidavit from her attorney, 
Michael Jarman, and an email exchange between Jarman and 
James Leyden, attorney for Teleflex.  (App. 954-57.)  These 
documents were not provided to the District Court.  Although 
it is the function of the appellate court to review the decision 
below on the basis of the record that was presented to the 
district court, a court of appeals may allow a party to 
supplement the record on appeal in “exceptional 
circumstances.”  Acumed LLC, 561 F.3d at 226.  In 
determining whether exceptional circumstances exist, the 
court may consider:  
 
(1) whether the proffered addition would 
establish beyond any doubt the proper 
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resolution of the pending issue; (2) whether 
remanding the case to the district court for 
consideration of the additional material would 
be contrary to the interests of justice and the 
efficient use of judicial resources; and (3) 
whether the appeal arose in the context of a 
habeas corpus action.  
 
Id. (quoting In re Capital Cities/ABC Inc’s Appl. for Access 
to Sealed Trs., 913 F.2d 89, 97 (3d Cir. 1990)).  Burton 
argues that supplementing the record is necessary because 
Jarman‟s affidavit and the accompanying email correct errors 
of fact committed by the District Court.  She claims that the 
documents demonstrate that Burton communicated with 
Teleflex after June 16, 2008 by and through Jarman (therefore 
refuting the District Court‟s claim that she had no 
communication with Teleflex after June 16, 2008), and 
demonstrate that Jarman did in fact contest whether Burton 
resigned.  (Appellant‟s Mem. 3-4.)  However, Burton could 
have produced this information in the first instance to the 
District Court in opposition to Teleflex‟s motion for summary 
judgment.  She nowhere claims that this information was not 
in her possession.  See Acumed LLC, 561 F.3d at 226 n.26 
(“[A] party should present everything it needs for a complete 
presentation on the motion [to the District Court] and, if 
necessary, seek additional time under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f) to 
marshal its evidence.”).   
 
 Burton claims that exceptional circumstances exist 
because she was unable to file a Motion for Reconsideration 
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under Rule 59(e),
12
 but she fails to explain why she did not 
include these documents in her original submissions to the 
District Court.  See Sigler v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 532 F.3d 
469, 477-78 (6th Cir. 2008) (denying motion to supplement 
record on appeal because “[p]ermitting [appellant] to 
supplement the record on appeal with information that she 
could have easily obtained much earlier would not advance 
the interests of justice and would not further efficient use of 
judicial resources”). 
 
 In addition, these materials add little to the record.  
The record presented to the District Court contains sufficient 
evidence to create a genuine dispute of material fact as to 
whether Burton resigned or was terminated.  Therefore, 
Burton‟s Motion to Supplement is denied. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the District 
Court‟s grant of summary judgment on Burton‟s 
discrimination claims brought under the ADEA, Title VII, 
and the PHRA, and vacate the grant of summary judgment on 
Burton‟s claim for breach of contract.  We affirm the grant of 
summary judgment on the remainder of Burton‟s state law 
                                              
12
 The District Court granted Teleflex‟s motion for summary 
judgment in an order without memorandum opinion on 
September 29, 2011, and issued its memorandum opinion on 
November 2, 2011.  In the interim, Burton filed a notice of 
appeal.  Because of the District Court‟s delay in issuing its 
opinion, Burton claims that she was unable to file a motion 
for reconsideration under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
59(e). 
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claims, and deny Burton‟s Motion to Supplement the Record.  
The case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this 
Opinion. 
